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The Strickland standard, the test for when an attorney's
representation of a criminal defendant falls below the minimum
requirements of the Sixth Amendment, has been widely criticized.
Critics argue that it is an empty vessel, providing no guidance to how
the standard is to be applied in the thousands of ineffective assistance of
counsel cases decided since Strickland. This confusion is demonstrated
by the frequently impenetrable and muddled logic used by lower courts
applying the standard. The result is an incoherent body of case law that
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is responsible for deciding whether a person convicted of a crime is
entitled to relief. Sometimes, it decides whether a person convicted of a
capital crime lives or dies.
This Article looks at the Strickland standard and the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence in that area and makes the implicit logic of those
cases into an explicit structure for applying the first of the standard's
two prongs. The explicit structure provides a potentially critical tool for
practitioners to effectively argue cases of ineffective assistance of
counsel and a way for courts to evaluate those claims quickly and
consistently. If courts and practitioners adopt this approach, the legal
system as a whole will be more transparent, predictable, objective, and
accurate when deciding these cases.
I. INTRODUCTION

The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ...

have the

Assistance of Counsel for his defence." ' Over the past eighty years, the
Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted this amendment to
give defendants facing the possibility of imprisonment the right to
counsel at any stage of the proceedings at which their right to a fair trial
could be jeopardized.2 The Supreme Court has also held that the Sixth
Amendment requires
that criminal defendants receive effective
3
representation.
To be effective, "counsel's representation [must not fall] below an
objective standard of reasonableness." 4 When the representation does
fall below this standard, the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel is violated. 5 Unfortunately, there
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
2. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that the right to counsel
applies to any proceeding at which the accused could be sentenced to imprisonment); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967) (holding that the right to counsel applies to any part of
the criminal prosecution process at which the right to a fair trial could be jeopardized); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 71 (1932) (holding that it is the duty of the court to appoint counsel
for a criminal defendant to ensure due process).
3. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970); Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
4. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). While this standard applies to
Sixth Amendment review of the effectiveness of counsel, state constitutions or statutes
frequently impose even higher standards for representation. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, NAT'L
RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 31 (2009) [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED], available at
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf. For example, in Oregon the right to counsel is
provided at any criminal proceeding, regardless of whether there is a possibility of
imprisonment. Id.
5. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. That violation will only entitle a petitioner with
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is no way to reduce the objective standard of reasonableness to a list of
duties that must be met in every case because defense counsel must
have the autonomy to react strategically to the unique circumstances of
each case. 6 As a result of this need for autonomy, a defendant's right to
effective assistance of counsel will also be violated if the government
to make
"interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel
7
independent decisions about how to conduct the defense."
Courts deciding ineffective assistance of counsel claims-claims
that are almost always raised in the context of a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus8-are faced with an even more difficult task because of
the way that the "objective standard of reasonableness" is measured. 9 In
Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court established a two-prong
test to evaluate whether a defendant is entitled to relief based on his or
her attorney's allegedly ineffective representation.10 The two prongs
are: 1) whether representation was unreasonable in light of prevailing
professional norms; and 2) whether there is a reasonable probability that
the outcome of the proceeding would have been different had
representation been effective.' I A court must find that both prongs are
satisfied before it can order that 12the defendant receive relief, such as
vacating a sentence or conviction.
The first prong is criticized as being inscrutable because of the
difficulty in determining what the "prevailing professional norms" were

relief if he shows that, but for the violation, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different. Id. at 694.
6. Id. at 688-89. Although no checklist can encompass everything that counsel must do
to be constitutionally effective, the Supreme Court has stated that "[r]epresentation of a criminal
defendant entails certain basic duties," including the "dut[ies] to avoid conflicts of interest," to
"consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of
important developments in the course of the prosecution," and "to bring to bear such skill and
knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process." Id. at 688.
7. Id. at 686.
8. Habeas corpus is "[a] writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently
to ensure that the person's imprisonment or detention is not illegal." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
Habeas Corpus, 778 (9th ed. 2009). The single most common ground upon which prisoners
claim that their imprisonment is illegal is that they did not receive constitutionally adequate
representation at trial. See ROGER HANSON & HENRY W.K. DALEY, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW: CHALLENGING STATE COURT CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 14 (1995),

availableat http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/bjs/ hcrcscc.pdf (finding that a plurality of 25%
of all habeas petitions filed by state inmates were based on claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel).
9. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (stating that "[m]ore specific guidelines are not
appropriate").
10. Id. at 687.
II. Id. at 687-88, 694.
12. Id. at 687, 691; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006) (stating that, if a habeas petition is
ultimately successful, a federal court shall "dispose of the matter as law and justice require").
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at the time of the representation. 13 Identifying the professional norms
that prevail at the specific time of representation is inherently
problematic because norms are immaterial and constantly evolve with
14
changes in the law and advances in investigative techniques.
The Strickland Court provided one source to consider when trying to
determine prevailing norms, saying that:
American Bar Association [("ABA")] standards and the like ...
are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only
guides. No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct
can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances
faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions
15
regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.
Applying the Strickland test in later cases, the Court has cited to
particular ABA standards and guidelines for professional conductincluding the 1980 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice," 1982 ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, 17 1993 ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice, 18 the 1989 ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases,' 9 and the
2003 ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 2-as evidence of the prevailing
standards for effective representation. A series of Supreme Court
13. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
14. See id. The duty to investigate provides a good example of the evolution of a
prevailing norm. See id. at 690-91. The Supreme Court has said that "counsel has a duty to make
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations

unnecessary." Id. at 691. Before DNA testing became widely available, it would not have been
part of a reasonable investigation. However, once DNA testing was widely available, counsel's
reasonable investigations likely came to include obtaining such testing or reasonably deciding
not to do so. See generally JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 4, at 76.
15. Strickland,466 U.S. at 688-89.
16. AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter 1980 ABA Criminal Justice Standards].
17.

AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE

FUNCTION (2d ed. 1982 Supp.) [hereinafter 1982 ABA Criminal Justice Standards].
18. Am. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter 1993 ABA Criminal Justice Standards].
19. AM. BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL INDEATH PENALTY CASES (1989) [hereinafter 1989 ABA Capital Guidelines].
20. AM. BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (2003) [hereinafter 2003 ABA Capital Guidelines].
21. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387, 408 nn.6-7 (2005) (citing 1982 ABA
Criminal Justice Standards, supra note 17; 1993 ABA Criminal Justice Standards, supra note
18; 1989 ABA Capital Guidelines, supra note 19); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522, 524
(2003) (citing 1980 ABA Criminal Justice Standards, supra note 16; 1989 ABA Capital
Guidelines, supranote 19); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (citing the 1980 ABA
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cases from 2000 to 2005 suggested that the Court had implicitly
recognized the ABA's published standards
of representation as a
22
definitive measure of reasonableness.
However, in Bobby v. Van Hook, decided in 2009, the Court
explicitly rejected this implicit suggestion. 23 In Van Hook, the Court
reiterated the Strickland standard while reversing a Sixth Circuit
decision because it relied on the 2003 ABA Capital Guidelines to
determine the prevailing standards of representation in 1985, rather than
the 1980 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice. 24 This could be seen as
continuing the trend of relying on the ABA's published standards,
reducing the Court's continued warnings to use such standards only as
guides to nothing more than lip service. However, in his concurrence in
Van Hook, Justice Alito "emphasized [his] understanding that... [i]t is
the responsibility of the courts to determine the nature of the work that a
defense attorney must do ...to meet the obligations imposed by the
Constitution," and stated that he did not see a "reason why the ABA
Guidelines should be given a privileged position in making that
determination., 25 Paired with the Supreme Court's consistent cautions
to use the ABA Guidelines and the like only as guides, Justice Alito's
concurrence raises significant questions about how prevailing
professional norms are determined.
The Supreme Court's failure to explain how to determine
professional norms-including the role played by standards like the
ABA's-has resulted in widespread confusion. To ameliorate this
confusion, this Article imposes a conceptual framework that reconciles
the Courts' jurisprudence on Strickland's first prong. Specifically, it
distinguishes between when a court can apply precedent and when a
court must look to various types of evidence (including standards like
the ABA guidelines) to determine in the first instance the prevailing
norms of a particular time. This Article also elaborates on how courts
should identify and weigh relevant evidence of prevailing norms in the
Criminal Justice Standards, supra note 16); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 799 n.4 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (2d ed. 1979)); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168,
191-92 (1986) (citing 1980 ABA Criminal Justice Standards, supra note 16); Nix v. Whiteside,
475 U.S. 157, 170 n.6 (1986) (citing ABA 1980 Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note 16;
AM. BAR ASS'N, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983)); Alvord v. Wainwright, 469
U.S. 956, 959 n.4 (1984) (citing the 1980 ABA Criminal Justice Standards, supra note 16; 1982
ABA Criminal Justice Standards, supranote 17).
22. John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, "It's Like Djei vu All Over Again ":Williams
v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial)Return to the Guidelines
Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 129 (2007).
23. See Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S.Ct. 13 (2009).
24. Id. at 16-17.
25. Id. at 20 (Alito, J., concurring).
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first instance. As a particularly persuasive form of evidence for
determining a prevailing norm, published standards are examined in
depth.
Part II of this Article explains the confusions that have arisen in
courts' applications of Strickland and the Supreme Court's failures to
correct those confusions. Part III sets out the analytical structure
proposed by this Article for applying Strickland's first prong. Finally,
Part IV concludes the Article, examining the effects of the clarified
analysis.
II. CONFUSION

IN THE APPLICATION OF STRICKLAND

Courts and scholars alike have lambasted the Strickland standard,
arguing that it provides no substantive guidance for evaluating the
effectiveness of counsel.26 While this Article contends that a thoughtful
analysis of the Strickland standard reveals a process by which courts can
evaluate counsel's effectiveness, the Supreme Court has not made it
explicit or easy to uncover. As a result, lower courts have been
inconsistent in applying Strickland. To fully understand this problem, it
is necessary to examine the history of this area of law before Strickland,
to look at Strickland's holding, and to analyze the confused
jurisprudence applying the Strickland standard since. Each of these
tasks will be addressed in turn.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Before Strickland
The Supreme Court first recognized the right to effective assistance
of counsel in 1932 in Powell v. Alabama.2 7 In Powell, the Court
addressed the validity of the convictions of three African American men
charged with raping two Caucasian girls, a crime punishable by death.28
The court described the defendants as "young, ignorant, [and] illiterate"
and noted that, as residents of other states, their families and friends
were not present for the proceedings. 29 Public hostility surrounding the
case was so strong that the military was called in to safeguard the

26. See Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called)Liability of CriminalDefense Attorneys: A
System in Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1, 50-52 (2002); William S. Geimer, A Decadeof
Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinaland PracticalUnderminingof the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 115 (1995); Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1446 (1999); Russell L. Weaver, The Perils of
Being Poor:Indigent Defense andEffective Assistance, 42 BRANDEIs L.J. 435, 441-42 (2004).
27. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66 (1932).
28. Id. at 57-58.
29. Id.
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defendants throughout the arraignment and trial.30
Despite the evident need for legal representation created by these
circumstances, the court did not appoint counsel until the morning of
the trial. 3 ' Upon review, the Supreme Court ruled that the defendants
were deprived of their constitutional right to effective counsel.32
Analyzing the right under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, the Court held that effective counsel requires more than the
mere presence of counsel at trial.33 The Court did not, however, hold
that effective counsel was always necessary. Instead, the Court implied
that this determination should be made on a case-by-case basis. 34 Left to
their own devices, lower courts adopted a variety of standards to
evaluate counsel's performance. 35
One of the most prevalent standards used after Powell was the "farce
and mockery" test. 3 Under this test, counsel's performance had to be so
egregious that it "'render[ed] the trial a farce and a mockery of justice
which shock[ed] the conscience of the court."' 37 Widely criticized for
the test made it very difficult to prove that counsel was
its vagueness,
38
ineffective.
When the Supreme Court finally revisited the issue of effective
representation in the 1970s, it did so under the auspices of the Sixth
Amendment.39 In McMann v. Richardson, the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel included the right to "competent
counsel."40 The issue in McMann was whether the attorneys' advice to
their clients to accept guilty pleas fell "within the range of competence
30. Id.at 51.
31. Id.at 56. Although the trial judge appointed every member of the local bar for the
arraignment, it was only speculative that the attorneys would represent the defendants at trial.
Id. In fact, one of the members of the bar "accepted employment on the side of the prosecution
and actively participated in the trial." Id. at 57-58.
32. Id. at 71.
33. Id.at 69-71. The right to counsel was not analyzed under the Sixth Amendment and
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Clause, making it
applicable to the states, until 1963 in Gideon v. Wainwright. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 343 (1963).
34. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71. The Court held that "under the circumstances . . . the
necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an
effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process." Id.
35. Blume & Neumann, supra note 22, at 131; see also Richard P. Rhodes, Jr., Note,
Strickland v. Washington: Safeguard of the Capital Defendant's Right to Effective Assistance of
Counsel? 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 121, 126 (1992).
36. See Blume & Neumann, supranote 22, at 131 (citing United States v. Long, 419 F.2d
91, 94 (5th Cir. 1969)).
37. Id.(quoting Long, 419 F.2d at 94); see also Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667,670 (D.C.
Cir. 1945).
38. Blume & Neumann, supra note 22, at 131; see also Rhodes, supra note 35, at 128.
39. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
40. Id.
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demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.' Consequently, lower courts
increasingly adopted a reasonableness standard to evaluate counsel's
performance and came to favor it over the farce and mockery of justice
42
test.
Although
new standard
was also43criticized for its vagueness, it
was seen
as morethe
favorable
to defendants.
B. Strickland
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Strickland v. Washington,
which set out a uniform standard to determine whether counsel's
performance entitles a criminal defendant to relief under the Sixth
Amendment.44 The two-prong Strickland test requires the defendant to
show that counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness" and that the "deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. '" 45 When applying this test, the Court assigned "a heavy
measure of deference to counsel's judgments." 46 The Court elaborated
on its reasoning, explaining that "[b]ecause advocacy is an art and not a
science, and because the adversary system requires deference to
counsel's informed decisions, strategic choices must be respected
in
47
these circumstances if they are based on professional judgment.
The Supreme Court went on to say that the obligations of effective
counsel, as envisioned by the Sixth Amendment, "rel[y] ...on the legal
profession's maintenance of standards ....48 Accordingly, effective
counsel should be defined by "prevailing professional norms" at the
time of representation. 49 In describing prevailing professional norms,
the Court noted that, although effective representation is comprised50 of
several basic duties, an exhaustive set of guidelines is inappropriate.
Nonetheless, some of the basic obligations of counsel include the
duty to: 1) avoid conflicts of interest; 2) "advocate the defendant's
cause"; 3) "keep the defendant informed of important developments";
and 4) "bring to bear skill and knowledge [needed to] render the trial a
41.

Id. at 770-71.

42. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 683 (1984) (noting that by 1984, "all the
Federal Court of Appeals and all but a few state courts... adopted the 'reasonably effective
assistance' standard in one formulation or another").
43. Whitney Cawley, Note, Raising the Bar: How Rompilla v. Beard Represents the
Court's Increasing Efforts to Impose Stricter Standards for Defense Lawyering in Capital
Cases, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 1139, 1148 (2007).
44. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-90.
45. Id.at 687-88.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.at 691.
Id.at 681.
Id.at 688.
Id.
Id.at 688-89.
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reliable adversarial testing process." 51 However, "these basic duties
neither exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor form a
checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance. ' 5 2 The Court
went on to state that standards such as the ABA's can be used as guides
for determinin; the prevailing professional norms at the time of the
representation.
C. Post-StricklandConfusion

Many critics have argued that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
effective assistance of counsel following Strickland has been
confusing.54 Justice Marshall's dissent in Strickland laid out the most
common objection to the standard, which is that it is "so malleable, that
in practice, it .

.

. [has] no grip" and "yield[s] excessive variation.

For sixteen years following Strickland, the standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel was almost impossible to overcome. 56 Frequently,
the lower courts deferred to "strategic" decisions of counsel, even when
these decisions were self-evidently the result of sloth or major errors in
judgment.
To understand the most important Supreme Court cases applying the
Strickland standard, some background is necessary. Each of the seven
cases-all of which are discussed below-concerned the investigation
and presentation of mitigation evidence in capital trials. 57 Since 1976,
the Supreme Court has required states with capital punishment to have
separate proceedings to determine guilt and to decide whether to impose
the death penalty. 58 To provide effective representation, lawyers
51. Id.at688.
52. Id. The idea for a checklist approach to evaluating effective assistance of counsel was
initially proposed by Judge Bazelon in his dissent in United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196,
264-300 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
53. See Strickland,466 U.S. at 688.
54. See Weaver, supra note 26, at 441-43; Duncan, supra note 26, at 50; Klein, supra
note 26, at 1446; Geimer, supra note 26, at 114-15.
55. Strickland,466 U.S. at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Mitchell v. Kemp, 483
U.S. 1026, 1026 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting that "[s]ince
Strickland was decided, the Court has never identified an instance of attorney dereliction that
met its stringent standard.").
56. See Blume & Neumann, supra note 22, at 142 (noting "[a]lmost all representation
was found to be within Strickland's 'wide range of professionally competent assistance."').
57. See Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2009); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776,
781 (1987); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184 (1986); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374,
388 (2005); Strickland,466 U.S. at 668; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 532 (2003); Williams,
529 at 362;.
58. In 1972, the Supreme Court struck down death penalty statutes that gave the jury
unguided discretion in imposing the death penalty. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256-57
(1972). In response, states that had the death penalty either eliminated all discretion in imposing
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typically must investigate any mitigating evidence for the sentencing
phase and, if they find it, present that evidence to the jury to try to avoid
the imposition of the death penalty. 59 However, because bifurcated
proceedings were not the norm until the mid-i 970s, this duty could not
have existed before that time. The question of when that duty came into
being and how it evolved over time demonstrates the difficulty of
applying the prevailing professional norms prong of Strickland.
In the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases on
ineffective assistance of counsel starting with Strickland6° in 1984,
continuing with Darden v. Wainwright6t in 1986, and concluding with
Burger v. Kemp 62 in 1987. In each of these cases, the Court held that the
defendant's attorney's investigation of mitigating circumstances for the
sentencing phase was constitutionally sufficient, meaning that the
defendant was not entitled to habeas relief.63 In a second trilogy of cases

between 2000 and 2005-Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, and
Rompilla v. Beard-the Court held in each case that the defendant's
attorney's investigation of mitigating circumstances was not
constitutionally sufficient, thus violating the defendant's Sixth

capital punishment by making certain offenses only punishable only by death, or created
guidelines to inform jury's decisions in imposing the capital punishment. Rhodes, supra note 35,
at 142-43. The Supreme Court struck down the former approach in Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). However, the latter approach was upheld in Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 195 (1976). Gregg also approved of the use of bifurcated trials and providing
guidance to the jury through the presentation of mitigating and aggravating evidence. Id. at 195.
The decision upheld death penalty statutes in Georgia, Florida, and Texas, and overturned
statutes in Louisiana and North Carolina. Faye A. Silas, The Death Penalty: The Comeback
Picks Up Speed, 71 A.B.A. J. 48, 50 (1985). As a result, states that did not already do so
adopted the guided discretion approach and moved to bifurcated trials in capital cases. Id.
59. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 396 (holding that the "failure to discover and present
significant mitigating evidence" constituted a Sixth Amendment violation of the right to
effective assistance of counsel). However, the Supreme Court indicated in Strickland that, as a
tactical decision, counsel may reasonably decide not to pursue certain types of mitigating
evidence. Strickland,466 U.S. at 688.
60. Strickland,466 U.S. at 668.
61. Darden, 477 U.S. at 168.
62. Burger,483 U.S. at 776.
63. Id. at 794 (holding that counsel's performance in a 1978 trial was reasonable when he
presented no mitigating evidence, despite noting that "[t]he record at the habeas corpus hearing
does suggest that [counsel] could well have made a more thorough investigation [of mitigating
evidence] than he did"); Darden, 477 U.S. at 185-87 (holding that counsel's performance in a
1974 trial was reasonable when he presented no mitigating evidence because of his mistaken
belief that the evidence would have been inadmissible, despite being told by the trial court that
the evidence was admissible); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 673, 701 (holding that counsel performed
reasonably in a 1976 trial, even though the attorney did not request a psychiatric examination,
did not try to find character witnesses, and only spoke with the defendant's wife and mother
over the telephone); see also Blume & Neumann, supra note 22, at 131-33.
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Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 64
What is confising about these cases is that the alleged failures of
representation in the first trilogy do not appear to be less serious than
the alleged failures in the second trilogy. This has led many scholars
to believe that the Supreme Court modified the Strickland test sub
silentio.6 6 A close examination of the two trilogies reveals that this
conclusion is unwarranted.
One can only make sense of these disparate outcomes if the Court
evaluated the adequacy of representation using different prevailing
norms in the two trilogies. This is exactly what has occurred. In the
three cases in which the Court held that the defendant's attorney's
investigation of mitigating circumstances for the sentencing phase was
adequate, the representation in question occurred between 1974 and
1978. 67 In the three cases in which the Court held that the defendant's
attorney's investigation of mitigating circumstances was not
constitutionally sufficient, the representation occurred between 1986
and 1989.68 At the time of representation in Darden, the earliest in the
first trilogy, the Supreme Court had not even mandated separate
64. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 389-90 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,
533 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 362-64; see also Blume & Neumann, supra note 22, at 135.
65. Gregory J. O'Meara, The Name is the Same, But the Facts Have Been Changed to
Protect the Attorneys: Strickland, Judicial Discretion, and Appellate Decision-Making, 42 VAL.
U. L. REV. 687, 687 (2008) ("In Wiggins v. Smith and Rompilla v. Beard, the Court found
representation provided by criminal defense counsel to have been ineffective. Yet, counsel in
both Wiggins and Rompilla did far more than trial counsel in Strickland v. Washington, where
the Court found counsel's representation to be effective under the Constitution."); see also
Blume & Neumann, supra note 22, at 147 ("To anyone familiar with capital litigation, it was
obvious that trial counsels' performance in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, although poor,
was by no means extraordinarily poor.").
66. See O'Meara, supra note 65, at 688 ("[A]lthough the Court continues to claim
adherence to the Strickland holding, its later cases focus on sorts of facts explicitly ignored in
the Strickland case, even though these facts were the bases for the state and federal court
decisions in that case. By changing which facts 'count' in ineffective assistance cases, the Court
has quietly changed the law."); Stephen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93
MARQ. L. REv. 515, 543 (2009).
67. Burger,483 U.S. at 778, 794 (holding that counsel's performance in a 1978 trial was
reasonable when he presented no mitigating evidence, despite noting that "the record at the
habeas corpus hearing does suggest that [counsel] could well have made a more thorough
investigation [of mitigating evidence] than he did"); Darden, 477 U.S. at 185-87 (holding that
counsel's performance in a 1974 trial was reasonable when he presented no mitigating evidence
because of his mistaken belief that the evidence would have been inadmissible, despite being
told by the trial court that the evidence was admissible); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 673, 701
(holding that counsel performed reasonably in a 1976 trial, even though the attorney did not
request a psychiatric examination, did not try to find character witnesses, and only spoke with
the defendant's wife and mother over the telephone); see also Blume & Neumann, supra note
22, at 131-33.
68. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 377-78; Wiggins, 539 U.S. 514-15; Williams, 529 U.S. at 36768; see also Blume & Neumann, supra note 22, at 135.
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sentencing proceedings in capital cases. 69 It is unsurprising that the
professional norms concerning mitigation evidence at capital sentencing
hearings had not become prevalent. By the first representation in the
second trilogy-1986--bifurcated capital trials had been required for
ten years. As a result,
it is unsurprising that prevailing professional
71
norms had caught up.
Additionally, in each of the cases in the latter trilogy, the Court
relied on ABA standards to evaluate counsel's performance. 72 This led
some commentators to believe that "Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla
stand for the proposition that the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice
should be used as norms for determining what is objectively reasonable
representation." 73 This was heralded as "some reason for optimism"
because "these recent decisions suggest the Court has seen the
limitations of the impenetrable Strickland standard, and is (finally)
attempting to effectuate real improvement in the representation of
indigent defendants, especially in capital cases.",74 However, this view
was soon to be refuted.
In 2009, the Supreme Court commented on the application of
professional standards in Bobby v. Van Hook.75 Rather than making
ABA standards the definitive measure of prevailing norms, as some
commentators thought the Court had in Williams, Wiggins, and
Rompilla, the Supreme Court simply reiterated and re-emphasized that
courts should use the ABA standards only as guides to "describe the
76
professional norms prevailing when the representation took place."
More than anything else, the fact that the Court believed that it had to
make this point demonstrates that it saw confusion in lower court's
application of Strickland and, in particular, how standards like the
ABA's factor into the Strickland analysis.
69.

See generally Darden,477 U.S. 168; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).

70.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 396; see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.

71. Despite the increased rigor of prevailing professional norms, there has been only a
minimal increase in the number of successful ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Kyle
Graham, Tactical Ineffective Assistance in Capital Trials, 57 AM. U. L. REv. 1645, 1653, 1658
(2008) (comparing ineffective assistance of counsel claims alleging that the attorney failed to
"adequately investigate or present mitigating evidence" at the defendant's capital trial in 1987
and 2007; and finding that in 1987, twenty-three of twenty-eight cases and, in 2007, thirty-five
of forty-two cases were procedurally barred or dismissed as lacking substance). While this could
be the result of improved performance by attorneys representing capital defendants, it is more
likely the result of courts' failure to consider the more rigorous norms when applying
Strickland.

72. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 400; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524; Williams, 529 U.S. at 396; see
also Blume & Neumann, supra note 22, at 129-30.
73. Blume & Neumann, supra note 22, at 129.
74. Id.
75. See Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S.Ct. 13, 19 (2009).
76. Id.at 16 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
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Van Hook, like the cases in the two trilogies discussed above, arose
in the context of a habeas claim concerning the adequacy of counsel's
representation when a defendant's attorney allegedly failed to properly
After a convoluted
investigate and present mitigating evidence.
78
had reversed the
Circuit
procedural history, a panel of the Sixth
district court's denial of Van Hook's habeas petition. 79 Relying on the
2003 ABA Capital Guidelines, the panel held that Van Hook's
Hook in 1985-did not adequately
attorney-who represented Van
80
evidence.
mitigating
investigate
In a per curium opinion, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the Sixth Circuit's decision.8 1 Although the Court explicitly denied that
the ABA Guidelines were anything more than guides to the court's
determination of the prevailing professional norms, the Court
nonetheless stated that the Sixth Circuit should have looked to the 1980
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice when looking at the 1985
representation, not those from 2003.82 The practical result of this switch
in the evidence relied on to determine prevailing norms is that a
substantially different (and less stringent) measure of the adequacy of
representation was applied.83 Although it would be easier to simply
apply the ABA standards and guidelines as definitive evidence of
prevailing professional norms, Justice Alito's concurrence warned
against just this conclusion. He "emphasized [his] understanding that
... [i]t is the responsibility of the courts to determine the nature of the
work that a defense attorney must do . . . to meet the obligations
imposed by the Constitution," and stated that he did not see a "reason
why the ABA Guidelines should be given a privileged position in
making that determination."8 4 Thus, Van Hook instructed the lower
courts to avoid interpreting ABA guidelines and standards as a checklist
of the mandatory duties of counsel while simultaneously showing lower
courts that they could be reversed for applying the wrong guidelines.
Van Hook's mixed message has played itself out in a confused array
of lower court decisions. Even considering only those cases that cite to
Van Hook, the significant majority either dismiss a petitioner's reliance
on ABA standards and guidelines or fail to mention the standards and
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Van Hook v. Anderson, 560 F.3d 523, 529-30 (6th Cir. 2009).
80. Id.
81. Bobby, 130 S. Ct. at 20.
82. Id. at 17.
83. See id. (explaining that the standards in the 2003 Guidelines and the 1980 Guidelines
are "[q]uite different" because the former had "expanded [on] what had been (in the 1980
Standards) [only] a broad outline of defense counsel's duties in all criminal cases into detailed
prescriptions for legal representation of capital defendants").
84. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. at 20 (Alito, J., concurring).
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guidelines altogether. 85 This certainly indicates that the lower courts at
least, have not interpreted the Supreme Court's more recent
jurisprudence to have adopted the ABA guidelines 86
and standards as a
checklist of what constitutes effective representation.
Some courts have wrongly interpreted Van Hook to mean that courts
should never rely on guidelines _published after the time of
representation. In Duty v. Workman," the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit held that it was inappropriate to rely on the 2003 ABA
Capital Guidelines because they were published three months after the
defendant's trial.89 In West v. Ryan, 90 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the 1989 ABA Guidelines were inapplicable
because they were not published until after the defendant's trial in
1988.91 However, this understanding is directly contradicted by the
Supreme Court's decision in Rompilla, in which the Court cited to a
standard published in 1989 to evaluate counsel's performance at a 1988
trial.92
Another misinterpretation of Van Hook is that the ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice are inherently better indications of prevailing
professional standards than the ABA Capital Guidelines. In extreme
cases, courts have relied on the ABA Standards over the ABA Capital
Guidelines even in capital cases when the Guidelines were published
closer to the time of representation than the Standards.93 Again, this
understanding would run directly contrary to those times
when the
94
Guidelines.
Capital
ABA
the
on
relied
has
Court
Supreme
85.

See, e.g., id.

86. See, e.g., State v. Craig, No. 24580, 2010 WL 1052203 at *3 (Ohio App. 9th Dist.
Mar. 24, 2010) (stating that Van Hook "rejected holding counsel to the standards of the
American Bar Association").
87. However, at least one court has relied on guidelines published after the time
representation occurred. In Jackson v. Kelly, the court cited to the 2003 ABA Guidelines as
evidence of the prevailing norms at the time of Jackson's trial, which occurred in October and
November of 2002. Jackson v. Kelly, 699 F. Supp. 2d 838, 845 (E.D. Va. 2010).

88.

366 F. App'x 863 (10th Cir. 2010).

89.
90.

Id. at 871 n. 6.
608 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2010).

91. Id. at486.
91. Craig, 2010 WL 1052203 at *3.
92.
93.

Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
In Sutton v. Bell, Young v. United States, and Robinson v. Schriro, the courts applied

the 1980 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice. Sutton v. Bell, 683 F. Supp. 2d 640, 670 (E.D.
Tenn. 2010); Young v. United States, No. 2:03-0040, 2010 WL 145513, at *12 (M.D. Tenn. Jan.
8, 2010); and Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010). In Sutton and Robinson,
the representation took place in 1988, and in Young, the representation occurred in 2000. It is
important to note that in Young and Schriro, the defendant satisfied the first prong in Strickland
despite the courts' failures to cite more current norms.
94. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387 (citing the 1989 ABA Capital Guidelines); Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. at 522 (2003) (same)
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Finally, despite the Supreme Court's holding in Van Hook, courts
continue to apply standards or guidelines without adequately
considering the date of the representation at issue in the case under
consideration. For example, cases have directly compared the alleged
deficiency in representation in Van Hook to the alleged deficiency in
representation in the case under consideration without taking into
account the fact that the ABA had published guidelines in between the
two. 95 This, perhaps more than any other problem in courts' analysis,
demonstrates the widespread confusion in the role that prevailing
professional norms play in the Strickland analysis.
Il. PROPOSED SOLUTION

There are two major sources of confusion in courts' application of
Strickland's first prong. The first source of confusion is the courts'
difficulty in recognizing when to apply precedent from other cases. The
second source of confusion is courts conflating guidelines that serve as
evidence of prevailing professional norms with the prevailing
professional norms themselves. Resolving the muddled application of
Strickland requires an explicit explanation of how to identify controlling
precedent in deciding ineffective assistance of counsel cases and how to
determine prevailing professional norms in the first instance.
A. Identifying ControllingPrecedent
Identifying controlling precedential opinions applying Strickland is
more difficult than identifying controlling precedential opinions in
many other areas of the law. Typically, a binding opinion will be
controlling precedent if it applies the same law to analogous operative
96
facts, unless the earlier opinion has been reversed or overruled.
95. Turner v. Epps, 412 F. App'x 696, 703-04 (5th Cir. 2011); Mickey v. Ayers, 606 F.3d
1223, 1241 (9th Cir. 2010); Barnes v. Burge, 372 F. App'x 196, 201 (2nd Cir. 2010); Sneed v.
Johnson, 600 F.3d 607, 610-11 (6th Cir. 2010); Reed v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 593 F.3d
1217, 1240 (1 1th Cir. 2010); Cox v. Ayers, 588 F.3d 1038, 1049 (9th Cir. 2009); Cummings v.
Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1340 (11th Cir. 2009); Stevens v. Beard, 701 F.
Supp. 2d 671, 690 (W.D. Pa. 2010); Com. v. Smith, 995 A.2d 1143, 1171 (Pa. 2010). In Van
Hook, the representation occurred in 1985, whereas the representation in the above-mentioned
cases took place after 1992. Id.; Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2009).
96. "Controlling," as used here, means that a case necessarily entails some or all of the
conclusions in a later case. "Binding," by contrast, means only that an opinion in an earlier case
was issued by an appellate court that must be followed by the court hearing the case under
consideration. While all controlling opinions are binding, not all binding decisions are
controlling. A binding opinion will not control a later case if it applied different law or
addressed different operative facts (including historical facts, like which professional norms
prevailed at a given time).
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Because the law typically remains static for defined periods of time (for
example, from the time a statute is enacted until it is amended), courts
attempting to identify controlling precedent tend to focus on whether
the operative facts of an earlier case in the same area of law are
analogous. The question of whether the law is the same is so obvious
that courts may forget that it is a necessary part of the analysis.
However, this oversight causes major problems in the Strickland
context.
The result of the Strickland standard's incorporation of prevailing
professional norms is that the norms that are to be applied evolve over
time, which implicitly changes the law applied. As the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence demonstrates, cases with functionally indistinguishable
facts may well have different outcomes when measured against different
prevailing professional norms.9 7 Thus, a court looking for controlling
decisions must consider the prevailing norms at the time of the
representation before evaluating the factual similarities of the alleged
deficiencies in representation. However, as 98Van Hook demonstrates,
courts sometimes fail to make this distinction.
A court trying to identify controlling precedent should first look to
binding precedent that addresses the same norm as the one at issue in
the case under consideration. 99 Binding precedent addressing prevailing
professional norms concerning the duty to investigate will not control a
case concerning the duty to present mitigating evidence. The reason that
this is so important is because courts may be tempted to conflate a norm
with the set of guidelines attempting to codify that norm. However, a set
of guidelines might codify two norms, only one of which had become
prevalent in the legal profession. Thus, a case finding that a particular
norm codified in a set of guidelines is a prevailing professional norm
should not be read to mean that every norm in that set of guidelines is a
prevailing professional norm. The initial step of matching the norms at
issue in the cases avoids this potential misstep.
A court's second step in identifying controlling precedent is to look
to binding precedent that applies at least as rigorous a standard of
representation as the one to be applied in the case under consideration.
Applying a less rigorous standard obviously does not create controlling
precedent because the decision does not necessitate the same finding
when a more rigorous standard is applied to analogous operative facts.
97. See supra Part II.C.
98. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. at 16.
99. This part is not suggesting that precedent that is not controlling-whether because of
the issuing court or because of differences in the operative facts or law-is not valuable for
courts to consider. Non-controlling binding precedent or non-binding precedent gives guidance
on the manner in which to evaluate evidence of prevailing professional norms as well as
providing factual analyses that may be relevant to other cases.
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For example, a case holding that failure to put forth mitigating evidence
did not fall below the standards of prevailing professional norms when
the representation occurred in 1978 does not mean that the same failure
would not fall below the standards of prevailing professional norms in
1986.100 However, a case holding that a failure in representation-for
example, an attorney's complete failure to advocate for his or her client
in 1931-would necessitate that the same failure would fall below the
standard of prevailing professional norms in 1978.101 Thus, cases with
equivalent or more rigorous standards of representation do constitute
binding precedent for later cases, assuming that the issuing court is the
appropriate one and that the opinion is not reversed or overruled.
Because the standard of representation has grown more rigorous over
time, cases finding ineffective assistance of counsel in earlier
representations-not to be confused with the date of the decisions
evaluating the sufficiency of that representation-will become binding
precedent for the evaluation of subsequent representations that form the
basis for claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.102
If binding precedent (1) addresses the same norm as the one at issue
in the case under consideration and (2) addresses a representation that
occurred when the prevailing norms were at least as rigorous as at the
time of the representation of the case under consideration, then it will
control on the issue of what professional norms prevailed at the time of
the representation in the in the case under consideration.
A court may then proceed to the third and final step in the analysis,
determining whether the operative facts are also the same. If they are,
then the case is entirely controlling, and the outcome of the case under
consideration should be the same as that of the controlling case. If not,
then the court need only apply the operative facts of the case under
consideration to the prevailing norm, as identified by the earlier case.
100. Compare Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 777-78 (1987) (rejecting claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel), with Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (finding
that conduct failed to meet professional standards).
101. Alternatively, a representation that is inadequate under the norms prevailing in 1980
will necessarily be inadequate under the norms applied in 2000. In Young v. UnitedStates, No.
2:03-0040, 2010 WL 145513, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Jan 8, 2010), the Middle District of Tennessee
applied the 1980 ABA Criminal Justice Standards as the prevailing norms for a representation
that occurred in 2000. See id. at *1. Although evidence of the prevailing norms in 1980 is almost
certainly not the best evidence of prevailing norms in 2000, because the norms in 2000 were
almost certainly more rigorous, the court's misapplication of Strickland did not affect the
outcome.
102. This trend, although not strictly necessary, is practically so. Unless a decision
overrules existing case law concerning the prevailing standards of professional conduct, each
decision finding that a particular deficiency in representation serves to lock in an equivalent or
higher standard of representation. In this way, precedent acts as a kind of ratcheting mechanism
that prevents the standard of representation from slipping backwards.
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Applying the above three-step analysis, a court applying Strickland
can identify controlling precedent. If there is controlling precedent, then
the court can rely on that precedent to decide the case under
consideration without further analysis, just as in any other kind of case.
The precedential effect of the earlier decision eliminates the need to
look to sources like the ABA Guidelines. This complies with the
to treat the ABA Guidelines and the like as
Supreme Court's0 warnings
"only guides."' 3 Similarly, it accords with Justice Alito's
"understanding that . . . [i]t is the responsibility of the courts to
must do... to
determine the nature of the work that a defense attorney
10 4
meet the obligations imposed by the Constitution."
B. Making a Determinationin the Absence of ControllingPrecedenton
PrevailingProfessionalNorms
When a court lacks controlling precedent, it must have a means to
decide whether an attorney's representation of a criminal defendant
amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. If the
only limitation in the precedent is that it has different operative facts
(i.e., it is controlling as to the norms to be applied), that decision is a
relatively straight-forward application of law to fact. However, if there
is no controlling precedent on the prevailing professional norm applied
to an allegation of a particular deficiency in representation, a court must
have a way to make a factual determination as to what the prevailing
professional norms were at the time of the representation in the first
instance. Making this determination requires courts to recognize valid
types of evidence for this inquiry and to understand how to weigh that
evidence. These tasks are addressed in turn below.
1. Types of Evidence of Prevailing Norms
To decide cases in the first instance requires courts to identify
evidence of what the prevailing professional norms were at a given
time. The most commonly cited type of evidence for those norms are
the ABA Guidelines, which is exactly the role that the Supreme Court
has repeatedly instructed that guidelines should serve. 105 However, the
jurisprudence and literature in this area has not looked much past the
ABA Guidelines. This failure is the cause of the Supreme Court's
06
repeated injunctions not to fetishize the ABA Guidelines.'
103.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984); see also Van Hook, 130 S.

Ct. at 17.
104. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. at 20 (Alito, J., concurring).
105. See Strickland,466 U.S. at 688-89; see also Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. at 17.
106. See Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. at 17.
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Unfortunately, neither the Supreme Court nor any commentator has
done a significant survey of what evidence is available to courts.
While courts can use any relevant evidence they find in determining
the prevailing professional norms at a particular time, imposing an
analytical structure on the universe of available evidence makes it easier
to see how it can be evaluated. The first division between different types
of evidence available to courts is between primary evidence and
secondary evidence.
Courts turn to primary evidence less frequently in determining
prevailing professional norms at a given historical time. However, it is
nonetheless used in cases applying Strickland.For example, in one case,
a court hearing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim considered
competing testimony from an expert witness and the attorney who
allegedly provided ineffective representation about the awareness of
mitigation as an issue among defense attorneys in capital cases at the
time of representation.l17 Other potential primary evidence of historical
prevailing norms might include the following sources from the time of
the allegedly ineffective representation: court decisions describing
existing professional norms, such as legal malpractice cases; decisions
from attorney disciplinary hearings;10 8 professional ethics opinions from
bar associations; published articles on standard of representation; and
written or spoken statements concerning standards of representation.
Any of these sources would give insight into what the prevailing
professional norms were, which courts could then use to measure an
attorney's representation of a criminal defendant at that time.
Courts more frequently use secondary evidence in determining
prevailing professional norms at a given point in time. The most
prevalent of these are, as previously stated, the ABA Guidelines.
However, these are hardly the only secondary sources available. For
example, the Supreme Court has cited to guidelines from the National
Legal Aid Defender Association and the U.S. Department of Justice's
Office of Justice Programs. ° 9 In the same case, the Court also
considered a law review article as evidence of the prevailing standard of
representation.11 0 The Court has also looked to the ABA Model Rules of
107. It is worth noting that, as in any case, the court must consider the credibility of the
witness when receiving testimony. Self-interest may affect the testimony of an attorney whose
representation is alleged to have been inadequate.
108. As far as the authors can determine, no court has yet relied on the outcome of a
disciplinary hearing against one attorney to determine the adequacy of another attorney's
representation when the two have engaged in the same misconduct.
109.

Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010); NAT'L LEGAL AID DEFENDER

ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES (1976); U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS: STANDARDS FOR
CAPITAL CASE REPRESENTATION

110.

(2003).

Padilla, 130S. Ct. at 1482.
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Professional Conduct. I '
While courts can and should consider any and all of these sources,
whether primary or secondary, the fact remains that published standards
and guidelines are the most commonly used. The next part addresses
how courts using standards and guidelines should decide which to use
as evidence of prevailing norms.
2. Factors to Consider in Identifying and Applying
Standards and Guidelines
Courts do not always apply the appropriate standard or guideline to
determine prevailing norms. Van Hook itself is an excellent example of
this. The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision because it
looked to the 2003 ABA Capital Guidelines to determine the prevailing
norms for a representation that took place in 1985.112 The Court
ultimately found that the 1980 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice
would have been more appropriate."13 However, the Court did not
explain how it reached that determination, making it difficult for lower
courts to know which standards or guidelines to apply in a given case.
While the Supreme Court may-and should-announce factors to
consider when determining which standards apply to the evaluation of
counsel's performance, the nature of the standards or guidelines that
provide some guidance on how to evaluate which standard or guideline
is the best evidence of prevailing professional norms. This part sets
forth five factors to consider in doing this evaluation. In addition, this
part explains how the Supreme Court's existing jurisprudence accords
with each factor.
The characteristics of a published set of standards or guidelines may
help a court to evaluate how likely the norms codified in those standards
or guidelines reflect prevailing professional norms. These
characteristics correspond to five factors for courts to consider: 1) the
publication date of the standards and the date of the representation; 2)
whether the standards are prescriptive or descriptive; 3) the type of case
involved (e.g. capital or non-capital); 4) the nature of the organization
announcing the purported norm; and 5) the method by which the
organization developed the set of guidelines announcing the purported
norm.
First, courts should compare the publication date of the available
guidelines to the date of the allegedly ineffective representation to help
111. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 157, 170, n.6 (1986) (citing the 1983 Model Rules
of Professional Conduct to determine prevailing professional norms for a representation that
occurred in 1977).
112. Bobbyv. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 16-17 (2009).
113. Id.
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decide which guidelines are most appropriate to use as evidence of
prevailing professional norms. Obviously, all other factors being equal,
a guideline published nearer in time to the date of the representation
will provide better evidence of prevailing norms than one published
further away in time. 1 4 Moreover, a standard published before the date
of representation will be more persuasive than one published afterward
because a standard published later might incorporate a norm that only
became a prevailing norm after the date of representation. The fact that
a guideline is published after the date of the representation, however,
does not preclude it from being the most persuasive evidence of
prevailing professional norms at the time of the representation. 115
The Supreme Court has consistently cited to the edition of a
particular set of guidelines nearest in time to the representation under
consideration. l l 6 Moreover, in Van Hook, the Supreme Court reversed
the Sixth Circuit's decision because the Sixth Circuit incorrectly relied
on the 2003 ABA Capital Guidelines to determine the prevailing norms
at the time of Van Hook's 1985 trial, rather than the 1980 ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice. 117 This reinforces the supposition that
114. See, e.g., id.
115. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 n.7 (2005) (citing the 1982 ABA Criminal
Justice Standards, the 1993 ABA Criminal Justice Standards, and 1989 ABA Capital Guidelines
to determine prevailing professional norms for a representation that occurred in 1988); Burger v.
Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 799 n.4 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing the 1979 second edition
of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice to determine prevailing professional norms for a
representation that occurred in 1978); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 191-92 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing the 1980 ABA Criminal Justice Standards to determine
prevailing professional norms for a representation that occurred in 1974); Nix, 475 U.S. 170 n.6
(1986) (citing the 1980 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice and the 1983 Model Rules of
Professional Conduct to determine prevailing professional norms for a representation that
occurred in 1977); Alvord v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 956, 960 n.4 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (citing the 1980 ABA Standards Criminal Justice and the 1982 ABA Criminal
Justice Standards to determine prevailing professional norms for a representation that occurred
in 1973).
116. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387 n.7 (citing the 1982 ABA Criminal Justice Standards,
the 1993 ABA Criminal Justice Standards, and the 1989 ABA Capital Guidelines for a
representation that occurred in 1988); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524-25 (2003) (citing the
1982 ABA Criminal Justice Standards and the 1989 ABA Capital Guidelines for a
representation that occurred in 1989); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (citing the
1980 ABA Criminal Justice Standards for a representation that occurred in 1986); Burger, 483
U.S. at 799 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice [sic]
(2d ed. 1979) for a representation that occurred in 1978); Darden,477 U.S. at 191-92 (citing the
1980 ABA Criminal Justice Standards for a representation that occurred in 1974); Nix, 475 U.S.
at 170 n.6 (citing the ABA 1980 Standards for Criminal Justice and the 1983 ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct for a representation that occurred in 1977); Alvord, 469 U.S. at 960 n.4
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing the 1980 ABA Standards Criminal Justice and the 1982 ABA
Criminal Justice Standards for a representation that occurred in 1973); see also Appendix A.
117. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. at 16-17.
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the Supreme Court has been implicitly been applying a similar analysis
for determining prevailing professional norms to the one discussed here.
Second, to determine whether a standard published after the date of
the representation could or should be considered in determining
prevailing professional norms, courts should consider whether the
standards were intended to be descriptive or prescriptive. Descriptive
standards attempt to codify existing norms, while prescriptive standards
set out what the organization promulgating the standards believes ought
to become the prevailing norms. Because descriptive standards codify
existing norms, they can be applied to representations before or after the
date of publication. 1 8 By contrast, prescriptive standards only become
prevailing norms when they are accepted by the legal profession (if
ever), 1 9 so they can only be applied to representations after the date of
publication.
To date, the Supreme Court has relied almost exclusively on
descriptive guidelines. As a result, none of the Court's opinions conflict
with the logical limitation on applying a prescriptive guideline to a
representation that occurred at or before the time of the representation.
However, one instance in which the Court did cite to a prescriptive
guideline is instructive. In Nix v. Whiteside, the Supreme Court cited to
the 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct when considering a
representation that occurred in 1977.120 While the Model Rules are
models, and therefore prescriptive, the Court explicitly stated that the
particular norm being discussed had been established since 1908. 121
Third, courts should take into account the type of case before
selecting a guideline as the best evidence of a prevailing professional
norm. When the alleged failure in counsel's representation is tied to the
specialized nature of a case-for example, investigating mitigation
evidence in a capital trial-a guideline or standard that is specific to that
area of the law will provide better evidence than one that is designed to
sweep more broadly. Because the Strickland test is only applied after a
criminal conviction, guidelines specific to criminal proceedings will
have greater evidentiary weight than those general to the practice of
law. Similarly, guidelines specific to capital cases will be better
evidence of the prevailing norms on issues in capital cases that are not
shared by all criminal cases.
118. For descriptive standards, courts can get a picture of how long a particular standard
has been in practice by referring to its commentary or to the introductory materials provided by
the organization promulgating them.
119. A good indicator of whether a prescriptive standard has become descriptive of current
practices is whether the standard has been cited, or otherwise relied on in court decisions or by
professional organizations.
120. Nix, 475 U.S. at 168.
121. Id. at 166-67.
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While the Supreme Court's Strickland jurisprudence does not
conflict with the idea that applicable specialized guidelines are
preferable to more general ones, it does not mandate that view either.
The Court has substantively relied upon the ABA Capital Guidelines in
capital cases but has done so only twice. 122 Moreover, in both cases, the
Court also cited other guidelines.1 23 It is impossible to know whether
that is because the Court does not value the specificity of guidelines or
because the facts of the particular cases before the Court made another
factor more important. The citations to the ABA Capital Guidelines at
least show that the Court does not object to more specific guidelines.
Fourth, courts should consider the characteristics of the organization
that publishes a standard containing purported professional norms. The
nature of the organization has a significant impact on the credibility of
its claim to announce existing or future professional norms. Larger
organizations will generally have better claims to represent the
prevailing norms of the legal profession simply because they represent a
greater proportion of the legal profession.
Similarly, organizations that draw their membership from a broader
cross-section of the legal profession will have a better claim to
announce the norms of the legal profession as a whole than
organizations that represent only one set of interests. For example, a
norm codified in a guideline published by an organization representing
only defense attorneys will likely have less claim to be a prevailing
professional norm than one representing both defense attorneys and
prosecutors. However, this will not always be the case. If defense
counsel fails to meet a standard established by an organization
representing those with adverse interests, such as a prosecutor's
association, then that would represent compelling evidence that the
standard has been accepted across the legal profession.
The Supreme Court has relied almost exclusively on guidelines
promulgated by the American Bar Association when determining
prevailing professional standards. 124 Given the above considerations,
122. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 n.7 (2005) (citing 1989 ABA Capital
Guidelines); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 510, 524 (2003) (citing 1989 ABA Capital
Guidelines). In 2008, the ABA published a supplement to the Capital Guidelines. Sean O'Brien,
When Life Depends on It: Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense

Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 693, 693 n. 1 (2008). Although the Supreme
Court has yet to rely on the supplement, at least one federal court has cited to it. Sells v.
Quartermann, No. SA-08-CA-465-OG, 2008 WL 4264516, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2008)
(citing to the supplement to stress the importance of "a qualified mental health professional in
helping to develop and lead any investigation into a capital murder defendant's background.").
123. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524-25.
124. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387 (citing the 1982 ABA Criminal Justice Standards, the
1993 ABA Criminal Justice Standards, and the 1989 ABA Capital Guidelines); Wiggins, 539
U.S. at 522 (citing the 1980 ABA Criminal Justice Standards (2d ed. 1982) and the 1989 ABA
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this is an ideal choice. 125 The ABA has over 400,000 members, drawn
from every part of the legal profession. 126 The ABA Special Committee
on Minimum Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice-the
group that developed the first of ABA Standards-was comprised of
"more than 100 of the nation's leading jurists, lawyers and legal
scholars . . . with the participants . . . drawn from every part of the
country and includ[ing] state and federal judges, prosecuting attorneys,
defense lawyers, Rublic defenders, law professors, penology experts and
police officials." 7 The Special Committee was eventually replaced by
a "standing committee of the [ABA] Section of Criminal Justice ...
28
composed... 'of a balance of defense, judiciary, and prosecution.""
Finally, how an organization decides on what norms to include in its
published guidelines will affect how much credence a court should
assign to that norm actually being prevalent in the legal profession. If
the process for developing the standard or guideline is objective,
deliberate, and non-partisan, then the norms announced in that guideline
will likely reliably reflect actual prevailing professional norms.
Alternatively, a process that seeks to advance a particular agenda or is
haphazard, is unlikely to reliably reflect actual prevailing professional
norms.
Because the single most compelling reason to use the guidelines
Capital Guidelines); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (citing the 1980 ABA
Criminal Justice Standards); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 799 n.4 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citing the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed. 1979)); Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 191-92 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing the 1980 ABA
Criminal Justice Standards); Nix, 475 U.S. at 170 n.6 (citing the ABA 1980 Standards for
Criminal Justice and the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct); Alvord v.
Wainwright, 469 U.S. 956, 960 n.4 (1984) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (citing the 1980 ABA
Standards Criminal Justice and the 1982 ABA Criminal Justice Standards).',
125. In his dissent in Pinholster v. Ayers, Chief Judge Alex Kozinski of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit argued that the majority had "strayed from the [Supreme] Court's
wise cautions in Strickland . . . [by] adopt[ing] a national standard embodied in the ABA
Guidelines . . . [because] these standards [do not] reflect the contemporary norms in the
community." Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d 651, 691 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting). To the extent that Chief Judge Kozinski was arguing that the ABA Guidelines
should be used only as evidence of prevailing norms, instead of as an embodiment of the norms
themselves, the authors agree. To the extent that he is arguing that ineffective assistance of
counsel should be measured against a local standard instead of a national one, that point is
beyond the scope of this Article. That said, it seems odd that the same act might or might not
violate a criminal defendant's right to competent representation under the U.S. Constitution
depending on local standards.
126. Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty Years of
Excellence, 23 CRIM. JUST. MAG. 10, 15 (2009); see generally History, AM. BAR Ass'N,
http://www.american bar.org/utility/about the aba/history.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
127. Marcus, supra note 126, at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted) (second and third
alteration in original).
128. Id. at 14 (quoting 1980 Criminal Justice Standards).
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promulgated by the ABA is the process by which they were developed,
the Court's heavy reliance on the ABA Guidelines indicates that the
Court takes this factor seriously. The "standards reflect a consensus of
the views of representatives of all segments of the criminal justice
system" after "more than 10 years of intense work, study, and debate
by" a broad spectrum of the legal profession. 129 Furthermore, "the
participants were drawn from every part of the country and included
state and federal judges, prosecuting attorneys, defense lawyers, public
defenders, law professors, penology experts and police officials."' 0 The
fact that ABA Standards and Guidelines are developed by a
representative of a wide cross-section of the stakeholders in the criminal
justice system adds to their objectivity. The deliberateness with which
the Standards and Guidelines were developed and have been updated
further increases the likelihood that they accurately reflect prevailing
professional norms.
The five factors based on the characteristics of particular published
standards and guidelines set forth above provide a rational means of
assessing which published guideline or standard constitutes the most
relevant evidence of prevailing professional norms. And, while
Supreme Court case law does not mandate that these factors be applied,
neither does it contradict their consideration. Indeed, it appears that the
Court has been implicitly considering at least some of these factors
since Strickland and, most evidently, in Van Hook. While the Court
should make its reasoning more explicit when it cites to a particular
published standard or guideline, in the absence of such guidance, lower
courts should consider these common-sense considerations in their own
analyses.
IV. CONCLUSION

Since the Supreme Court decided Strickland,the Strickland standard
has been criticized 13 1 and haphazardly applied. 132 The biggest problems
with the Strickland standard, however, are in its application.
Specifically, courts have never been told how to determine prevailing
norms. Therefore, their conclusions are haphazard and subject to claims
of being motivated by outcome, rather than decided by process. By
unpacking the Strickland standard and laying out a detailed
129. Id.(quoting Chief Justice Warren Burger, former chair of the Criminal Justice
Standards Project).
130. Id. (quoting Chief Justice Warren Burger).
131. See Duncan, supra note 26, at 50-42; Geimer, supra note 26, at 115; Klein, supra
note 26, at 1446; Weaver, supranote 26, at 441-42.
132. See supra Part II.C.
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methodology for identifying controlling precedent and for determining
prevailing norms in the absence of controlling precedent, this Article
provides a detailed structure for courts and practitioners to frame
ineffective assistance of counsel cases under existing law. That structure
benefits the courts and practitioners that employ it as well as the legal
system as a whole.
Courts using this structure to decide ineffective assistance of counsel
claims benefit because they can avoid reinventing the wheel every time
they have to apply the Strickland standard. Instead, courts can
concentrate on identifying the relevant case law and, in the absence of
controlling case law, the most persuasive evidence of prevailing
professional norms. This structure also creates more uniform,
transparent reasoning, which allows appellate courts to more quickly
and accurately review lower courts' decisions.
Practitioners using this structure to argue ineffective assistance of
counsel claims benefit because they can structure their arguments in a
more coherent and convincing way, rather than trying to blindly apply
precedent and evidence of prevailing norms. Moreover, the structure
helps attorneys identify which evidence of prevailing professional
norms will help them make their cases. This structure also enables them
to articulate why the evidence they present is more relevant or credible
than their opponents'. Even if both sides use the structure, it will narrow
and define the points of contention to avoid the unnecessary work of
arguing irrelevant or hopeless points.
The biggest beneficiary to providing a defined structure for applying
the first prong of the Strickland standard is the legal system as a whole.
First, by cabining analysis into discrete steps, courts can avoid creating
broader precedent than is necessary to decide the case under
consideration. Narrow precedents ensure that courts bound by stare
decisis have as much freedom as possible to make the best decision in
later cases. Second, by following a defined analytical process, courts'
decision-making will be more transparent. Transparency increases
predictability and decreases the perception that courts decide cases
based on their preferred outcomes (as well as decreasing the opportunity
for courts to actually do so). Predictability and the perception of
impartiality, in turn, reinforce the public's faith in the judiciary.
The application of Strickland frequently decides whether a person
convicted of a crime continues to serve his or her sentence or is entitled
to relief. Sometimes, the application of Strickland decides whether or
not a person is put to death. Questions of this gravity demand the most
rigorous, thoughtful analysis that the law can provide. Hopefully, by
applying the structure outlined in this Article, the courts and advocates
can take a significant step toward that goal.
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APPENDIX

UPON BY THE
A: DATES OF STANDARDS RELIED
133
SUPREME COURT

134
Dates of Publication of Standards Relied Upon by the Supreme Court

Year

ABA

ABA

ABA

Capital

Criminal

Supplemental

Guidelines

Justice

Guidelines for

Standards

the Mitigation

Function of
Defense
Teams

NLADA

DOJ

Standards for

Performance

Compendium of

Appointment of

Guidelines for

Standards for

Counsel in

Criminal

Indigent

Death Penalty
Cases

Representation

Defense
Systems:
Standards for
Capital Case
Representation

NLADA

X

2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001

x

X

2000
1999
1998
1997

133. NAT'L LEGAL AID DEFENDER Ass'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS N THE
UNITED STATES (1976); 1980 ABA Criminal Justice Standards; 1982 ABA Criminal Justice
Standards; NAT'L LEGAL AID DEFENDER ASS'N, NLADA STANDARDS FOR APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL INDEATH PENALTY CASES (1985); 1989 ABA Capital Guidelines; 1993 ABA Criminal
Justice Standards; 2003 ABA Capital Guidelines; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF
STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS: STANDARDS FOR CAPITAL CASE REPRESENTATION

(2003); Sean O'Brien, When Life Depends on It: Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation
Function ofDefense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 693 (2008).
134.

NAT'L LEGAL AID DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE

UNITED STATES (1976); 1980 ABA Criminal Justice Standards; 1982 ABA Criminal Justice
Standards; NAT'L LEGAL AID DEFENDER ASS'N, NLADA STANDARDS FOR APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL INDEATH PENALTY CASES (1985); 1989 ABA Capital Guidelines; 1993 ABA Criminal
Justice Standards; 2003 ABA Capital Guidelines; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF
STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS: STANDARDS FOR CAPITAL CASE REPRESENTATION
(2003); Sean O'Brien, When Life Depends on It: Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation
Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 693 (2008).
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ABA

ABA

NLADA

NLADA

DOJ

Capital

Criminal

Supplemental

Standards for
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Guidelines
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Guidelines for
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Defense

Cases
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Systems:

Teams

Standards for
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1996
1995

1994
X

1993
1992
1991
1990

1989

X

1988
1987
1986
X

1985
1984
1983
1982

X

1981
1980

X

1979

1978
1977
1976

X

